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AMultifactorial Risk Prioritization Framework
for Foodborne Pathogens
Juliana Martins Ruzante,1 Valerie J. Davidson,2,∗ Julie Caswell,3 Aamir Fazil,4 John A. L.
Cranfield,5 Spencer J. Henson,5 Sven M. Anders,6 Claudia Schmidt,5 and Jeffrey M. Farber7
We develop a prioritization framework for foodborne risks that considers public health im-
pact as well as three other factors (market impact, consumer risk acceptance and perception,
and social sensitivity). Canadian case studies are presented for six pathogen-food combina-
tions:Campylobacter spp. in chicken; Salmonella spp. in chicken and spinach;Escherichia coli
O157 in spinach and beef; and Listeria monocytogenes in ready-to-eat meats. Public health
impact is measured by disability-adjusted life years and the cost of illness. Market impact is
quantified by the economic importance of the domestic market. Likert-type scales are used to
capture consumer perception and acceptance of risk and social sensitivity to impacts on vul-
nerable consumer groups and industries. Risk ranking is facilitated through the development
of a knowledge database presented in the format of info cards and the use of multicriteria de-
cision analysis (MCDA) to aggregate the four factors. Three scenarios representing different
stakeholders illustrate the use of MCDA to arrive at rankings of pathogen-food combinations
that reflect different criteria weights. The framework provides a flexible instrument to sup-
port policymakers in complex risk prioritization decision making when different stakeholder
groups are involved and when multiple pathogen-food combinations are compared.
KEYWORDS: Consumer; DALY; food safety; pathogens; public policy; risk prioritization
1. INTRODUCTION
Experts and stakeholders have urged the devel-
opment of science- and risk-based systems to priori-
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tize and manage foodborne hazards by cost-effective
means in order to lower the incidence and impacts of
human foodborne disease. Internationally, govern-
ments and nongovernmental organizations are un-
dertaking efforts to develop new and more efficient
food safety controls directed at specific foodborne
hazards in order to improve public health. In prac-
tice, managers face difficult challenges in marshalling
the data and information needed to guide their deci-
sions on priorities for controlling foodborne risks.
We present a framework for prioritizing these
risks that addresses these challenges in two impor-
tant ways. First the framework recognizes that multi-
ple health, economic, and social factors may play a
role in prioritization. While public health concerns
are frequently first and foremost in risk managers’
concerns, other characteristics of risks also influence
decision making. A review shows that most ap-
proaches to risk prioritization developed to date are
based on measures of health outcomes and do not
systematically account for other factors that may be
important to decision making.(1) Our framework sys-
tematically develops information on these factors
in order to facilitate more consistent and transpar-
ent risk comparison and prioritization. Second, the
framework develops two formats (info cards and
multicriteria decision analysis) for presentation of
data and analysis to risk mangers for their use in pri-
oritization. These formats are flexible and allow risk
managers, as well as different stakeholders, to choose
appropriate ranking criteria and a weight for each
criterion. We demonstrate the framework with six
pathogen-food case studies based on Canadian data.
To our knowledge, this is the first framework to
jointly consider public health and other factors rel-
evant to the prioritization of microbial foodborne
risks including estimates of market-level impact, con-
sumer perception and acceptance of risk, and social
sensitivity for consumers and firms in a rigorous man-
ner. Furthermore, the multicriteria ranking process is
transparent in terms of criteria and weights and al-
lows for systematic evaluation of different scenarios
based on stakeholders’ goals and interests.
2. RATIONALE FORMULTIFACTORIAL
RISK PRIORITIZATION
Decision-making and risk-ranking processes for
foodborne pathogens operate within a socioeco-
nomic and political context and should aim at ef-
fective food risk mitigation strategies that are in the
public interest. In recent years, improved surveil-
lancemethods have become available to provide data
for the scientific and risk-based analysis of foodborne
pathogens as well as the design of effective mitiga-
tion strategies. However, despite improvements in
data availability, only a few attempts have beenmade
to develop an integrated and harmonized system for
risk management that allows decisionmakers to pri-
oritize risks and interventions in an evidence-based
yet multidisciplinary manner.(2,3) Review of current
microbial risk management systems suggests a strong
focus on mitigating the human health impacts of
foodborne diseases.
Microbial food-safety incidents resulting in size-
able market disruptions and public media attention
have accentuated the need to incorporate broader
economic and public factors into food risk prioriti-
zation. For example, the National Research Council
in the United States,(4) the United Kingdom,(5) and
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency(6) have
emphasized the consideration of multiple science-
based risk indicators in order to achieve greater con-
sistency and public acceptance of governmental risk
appraisal guidelines. In particular, the role of pub-
lic concerns, consumer perceptions, and economic
risks were acknowledged as important factors as part
of the risk assessment process that previously has
not been included. Havelaar et al.(7) also present a
strong rationale for using an integrated approach
based on epidemiology, risk assessment, and eco-
nomics to support risk management decisions. More-
over, recent discussion at a joint FAO/WHO ex-
pert consultation on incorporating microbiological
risk assessment in the development of food safety
standards and guidelines(3) supports the adoption of
an integrated and multifactorial risk assessment and
presents a strong rationale for the consideration of
market and trade impacts in risk management de-
cisions. For example, a FAO/WHO expert meeting
convened to address microbial concerns regarding
fruits and vegetables defined six criteria to be used to
rank commodities. Three criteria are associated with
the market impact: size and scope of production, di-
versity and complexity of production chain/industry,
and extent of international trade and economic
impact.(8)
In the United States, the Food Safety Research
Consortium has developed a risk-ranking tool that
evaluates multiple aspects of public health including
incidence, severity of outcomes, monetary (e.g., cost
of illness), and nonmonetary factors (quality adjusted
life years).(9) Beyond, the New Zealand Food Safety
Authority’s microbial risk management framework
includes public health measures weighted by sever-
ity in the general public and subpopulations and
acknowledges economic implications of foodborne
pathogens on trade.(10,11) The European Commis-
sion (12) and International Risk Governance Coun-
cil (IRGC)(2) have put forward integrated conceptual
frameworks that highlight the importance of balanc-
ing scientific, economic, social, and cultural aspects of
risks and benefits as well as risk-benefit distribution
within society. The IRGC proposal is a general ap-
proach to risk governance, not specific to foodborne
risks.(2) To our knowledge, it is still conceptual and
has not been implemented.
After review of the above literature, we chose
four major factors to be included in our multifac-
torial risk prioritization framework for foodborne
pathogens: public health, market impact, consumer
Fig. 1. Information flows between the
multifactorial risk prioritization
framework and a typical risk
management cycle.
perception and acceptance of risk, and social sensitiv-
ity. These factors were chosen to give complete but
distinct coverage of the factors that affect decision
making by risk managers. As described in the next
section, multiple measures are used to quantify each
of the four factors.
The multifactorial risk prioritization framework
is a new component to be added to the cycle of steps
common to many risk management approaches in
use around the world. For example, Fig. 1 shows
Health Canada’s cycle(13) as the outer loop of the
figure, with the addition of the risk prioritization
framework as a new hub of the system. The steps
in the outer loop are generally followed in a sequen-
tial order, beginning with risk evaluation (Block A).
The assessment step (Block B) includes formal sci-
entific processes to generate detailed knowledge of
the risks. Although the assessment step is an inte-
gral component of a risk management framework, it
is generally undertaken by experts with required sci-
entific and technical skills rather than risk managers.
Risk management (Block C) includes reviews of op-
tions and implementation of interventions based on
knowledge derived from risk assessments and is fol-
lowed by routine surveillance and data gathering de-
signed to track specific interventions (Block D).
The multifactorial risk prioritization framework
presented here is positioned in the center of the over-
all decision-making cycle. In an iterative process, it
provides information and tools to support risk evalu-
ation and management and is updated by new infor-
mation generated by the assessment and surveillance
steps. The hub is a knowledge base and tools to sup-
port multifactorial risk prioritization. The knowledge
base consolidates data from a wide range of sources,
including scientific literature, government agencies,
industry groups, and expert opinions. Several mea-
sures are combined to calculate indicators for all four
factors. The knowledge base must be updated on a
regular basis because risk management is an iterative
process and managers reevaluate priorities at peri-
odic intervals. To date, the multifactorial risk prior-
itization framework has two tools (formats) to sup-
port prioritization for foodborne risks: detailed info
cards for each of the four factors andmulticriteria de-
cision analysis based on the factors. This framework
is not intended to replace decisionmakers; instead,
it facilitates decision making by experts and ensures
that problem formulation and analysis are transpar-
ent and defensible.
3. MEASURING THE FACTORS
AND DEVELOPING INFO CARDS
The basic building block of the framework’s
knowledge base is a pathogen-food combination.
The knowledge base is implemented through Ex-
cel spreadsheets that hold information for each of
the four factors (public health, market impact, con-
sumer perception and acceptance, and social sensitiv-
ity) for each pathogen-food combination. Info cards
including explanatory text in consistent formats are
then used to summarize key data and calculated val-
ues. A set of four cards (one for each major factor)
for each pathogen-food pair provides a base level of
information for decisionmakers, including the most
recent annual and three-year average values where
appropriate. There is also a summary card for each
pathogen-food pair that presents the multifactorial
risk profile.
The measures used for each of the four factors
are described in detail below. We present six Cana-
dian case studies in this article to illustrate the col-
lection and use of data for the multifactorial risk pri-
oritization framework, as well as the application of
the framework’s decision tools. The six combinations
were chosen based on the authors’ expert knowl-
edge to capture a diverse range of impacts across the
four major factors in order to demonstrate fully the
functionality of the framework. These six case stud-
ies are: Campylobacter spp. in chicken; Salmonella
spp. in chicken and spinach; Escherichia coli O157
in spinach and beef; and Listeria monocytogenes in
ready-to-eat meats. It was not possible to match time
frames exactly for all of the data and calculations
(e.g., incidence data were available up to 2004 but
market data were available up to 2006). However,
comparisons are made across case studies using data
from identical time frames for each factor with one
exception that is noted in the measures for public
health. Info cards for the case study of Campylobac-
ter spp. in chicken are used for illustration.
3.1. Public Health Factor
Public health impacts of foodborne risks are a
primary factor of concern for risk managers in mak-
ing prioritization decisions. In the multifactorial risk
prioritization framework, the info card for the public
health factor for each pathogen-food combination in-
cludes a short description of the type of foodborne ill-
ness (es) that can occur, sources of data, a health out-
come tree, and a table of data for the latest year used
and for a three-year average ending in the latest year
used. The tree of health outcomes illustrates the dis-
tribution of illnesses by severity level and the poten-
tial for long-term sequelae for a particular pathogen.
Fig. 2 shows the public health info card for Campy-
lobacter spp. in chicken. The info card is the first tool
the framework makes available to decisionmakers.
We selected the calculated disability-adjusted
life years (DALY) and cost of illness (COI) asso-
ciated with a particular pathogen-food combination
as summary measures of public health impact to
be compared across pathogen-food combinations.
DALY is a summary measure of a population health
gap and combines morbidity and mortality mea-
surements in a single parameter. DALY values are
not biased by regional or national health-care costs
and were used to quantify burden of disease in the
World Health Organization Global Burden of Dis-
ease Study.(14,15) A DALY variant was also used by
the World Bank in its seminal review of health sec-
tor priorities.(15) We recognize that there is ongoing
discussion about the appropriate values for disability
weights that reflect the valuation of the time lived in
a nonfatal health status.(16) For the case studies, we
use the values proposed by Kemmeren et al.(17)
In addition to the DALY, we also use the mon-
etary measure cost of illness (COI) as a summary
health measure to better capture the economic di-
mension of the public health impact for foodborne
microbial risks. Cost of illness measures the actual
value of expenditures for medical care and foregone
wages arising from the illness, as opposed to the
hypothetical value from willingness to pay (WTP),
another monetized measure available for assessing
health impacts. Compared to WTP, the COI ap-
proach does not require assumptions on the struc-
ture of preferences when aggregating across the
population and is the preferred approach for this
framework.
Although the two summary measures of public
health overlap to some degree, we believe that both
are important for risk ranking and that they pro-
vide complementary information. Two recent stud-
ies(18,19) highlight that COI calculations fail to ac-
count for costs associated with pain and suffering,
loss of quality life, and psychological factors. The
DALY measure, on the other hand, captures factors
that affect quality of life and weights pain and suffer-
ing according to the severity of the outcome. How-
ever, monetization of the DALY can be complicated
because it represents the cumulative loss of years and
does not necessarily reflect the actual cost of a dis-
ease to society. In the cases presented here, we con-
sider both measures to quantify the public health im-
pact. Ultimately, however, it is up to risk managers to
decide whether to include both DALY and COI or a
single public health criterion in the ranking step.
The DALY and COI measures are based on an
estimate of the total illness attributed to a particular
Fig. 2. Information card for public
health: Campylobacter spp.—Chicken.
pathogen-food combination. The total number of
illnesses is estimated from reported incidence20 and
population data as follows:
Total number of illnesses attributed to a pathogen-
food combination
= Reported incidence rate for the pathogen
×Canadian population
×Percentage of illness transmitted by food
×Proportion attributable to a particular food
×Underreporting factor. (1)
Estimates of the percentage of illness transmitted by
food and the proportion attributable to a particu-
lar food are taken from Lee and Middleton(22) for
salmonellosis and campylobacteriosis in chicken. For
all other pathogen-food combinations, estimates are
taken from a foodborne outbreak database main-
tained by the Health Risk Modeling section of the
Laboratory for Foodborne Zoonoses, Public Health
Agency of Canada (Personal communication: Judy
Greig, Public Health Agency of Canada). Underre-
porting factors for all of the pathogens except L.
monocytogenes are derived from a Canadian study
Table I. Data Sources for DALY and COI Calculations
Pathogen-Food Combinationa
Parameters C-C S-C S-S L-RTEM E-S E-B
Mild, moderate, &
severe outcomes
Buzby et al.(60),
Lee and
Middleton(22)
USDA/ERS(28),
Lee and
Middleton(22)
Voetsch et al.(61),
Doorduyn et al.(62)
Frenzen et al.,(18)
Tarr et al.,(63)
Griffin,(64)
Boyce et al.(65)
Long-term sequelae Buzby et al.(60) Not applicable Voetsch et al.,(61)
WHO Listeria Risk
Assessment(66)
Tarr et al.,(63)
Griffin,(64)
Boyce et al.(65)
Duration of illness and
loss of work days
Majowicz et al.(19) OCCI(29) Frenzen et al.(18)
Fatalities Lee and Middleton(22) Doorduyn et al.(62) Rangel et al.(67)
Medical care
utilization rates
Majowicz et al.(19) No data available for Listeria;
assumed same as E. coli
(Frenzen et al.(18))
Frenzen et al.(18)
Loss of productivity Majowicz et al.(19) OCCI(29) Frenzen et al.,(18)
Tserenpuntsag et al.,(68)
Garg et al.(69)
aCampylobacter spp. in chicken (C-C), Salmonella spp. in chicken (S-C), Salmonella spp. in spinach (S-S), E.coli O157 in spinach (E-S),
E.coli O157 in beef (E-B), L. monocytogenes in ready-to-eat meats (L-RTEM).
conducted by Thomas et al.(23) The underreporting
factor for L. monocytogenes is based on data from
the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and Food.(24)
Mild, moderate, and severe levels of illness are
defined using guidelines proposed by the Economic
Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture
(ERS/USDA).(18) The mild category includes cases
that did not visit a physician and recover fully;
moderate cases are those that visit a physician, use
the emergency room or walk-in-clinic, and recover
fully; and severe cases are those that are hospital-
ized, some recover and others die. The probabilities
of developing long-term sequelae, such as Guillain-
Barre´ syndrome (GBS) in campylobacteriosis cases,
are obtained from the literature for each pathogen
as summarized in Table I. For E. coli O157, there
are three categories for severe outcomes: hospital-
ized cases with and without haemolytic uremic syn-
drome (HUS) and hospitalized HUS cases that de-
veloped end-of-stage renal disease (ESRD). For L.
monocytogenes, there are two main categories of
outcomes: noninvasive (febrile gastroenteritis form)
and invasive (perinatal and nonperinatal) with the
long-term sequelae being neurological disorders.
The number of cases for each health outcome in
the tree is estimated by multiplying the total num-
ber of illnesses (Equation (1)) by the frequency for
the outcome. The number of deaths associated with
a pathogen-food combination is calculated accord-
ing to the method suggested by Mead et al.(25) as
the number of reported illnesses(20) attributed to that
combination multiplied by twice the case fatality rate
for the pathogen to account for underreporting.
The DALY is computed for each pathogen-food
combination by summing the years of life loss (YLL)
and the years lived with disability (YLD), as fol-
lows:(14,17)
DALY = YLL∗ + YLD∗∗, (2)
∗YLL (Years of Life Loss) = ∑9j=1 dje j (j = age
group, d = # deaths, e = expected life span for
age group); ∗∗YLD (Years Lived with Disability) =∑
l nl tlwl (l = health outcome, n = # of cases, t = du-
ration of the illness, w = disability/severity weight).
Nine age categories (0–4, 5–9, 10–14, 15–19, 20–
24, 25–29, 30–39, 40–59, and ≥60 years) are used
in the calculation of YLL. The reported incidence
rate by age group,(20) demographic data,(21) and
the adjusted case fatality rates described previously
are used to estimate the number of deaths for each
age category. Life expectancy data for the Canadian
population are obtained from Statistics Canada.(26)
Estimates of illness duration are from the sources
defined in Table I and varied with illness severity
and pathogen. For each pathogen, disability weights
for all health outcomes are obtained from previously
published studies.(17,27)
The COI is calculated based on the methodology
used by ERS(18,28) and includes direct medical costs,
loss of productivity, and loss of life. Medical care
utilization includes the number of physician office,
walk-in-clinic, home, emergency room, and outpa-
tient clinic visits and hospitalizations for each sever-
ity outcome. The rates of use of these services are
based on estimates derived from a population-based
survey of the incidence and costs of gastroenteritis in-
fections in Hamilton, Ontario.(19) Medical care costs
on a per case basis are based on the standard fees
payable under the Ontario Health Insurance Plan.
In Canada healthcare is a provincial responsibility
and medical costs vary across the country. Ontario
costs for physician fees and hospitalizations are used
in this analysis to maintain consistency with the On-
tario case costing initiative (OCCI) data used for hos-
pitalization costs (see below). Furthermore, Ontario
is the province with the largest share (38%) of the
Canadian population. Further development of costs
by province will provide a more precise national COI
estimate.
Hospitalization costs are derived from the
OCCI(29) for nonchronic Campylobacter and
Salmonella infections, HUS, and ESRD. Average
costs for the period 2002–2006 are extracted from the
OCCI database. Since hospitalization costs forE. coli
O157 infections, Guillain-Barre´ syndrome (GBS),
and listeriosis cases are not available through OCCI,
the following assumptions are made. Hospitaliza-
tion costs for E. coli O157 infections are assumed
to be the same as for nonchronic Campylobacter
infections. It is assumed that all GBS cases required
an extended period of hospitalization, so the cost
per case is taken as the maximum estimated cost of
hospitalization for degenerative nervous disorders
provided by OCCI. The latter is also used for the
neurological disorders associated with listeriosis. For
severe cases of listeriosis, the average cost for “other
meningitis” and “other septicaemia” from OCCI
are used. Hospitalization costs for fatal and nonfatal
cases are assumed to be equal. Direct medical costs
are calculated based on the estimated number of
cases and costs for each outcome and then summed
to a total cost across all outcomes.
Productivity costs are calculated based on a val-
uation of time lost from work because of illness and
do not include productive activities outside the paid
workforce such as stay-at-home mothers or the el-
derly. The calculations are based on an assumption
that 54.7% of the Canadian population is in paid em-
ployment, an estimate derived from the 2006 Census
undertaken by Statistics Canada.(30) The number of
days spent away from work is obtained from a va-
riety of sources (Table I) and is a function of both
the pathogen and severity level. The estimated value
of a single day’s loss of productivity is based on the
average rate for a day of paid employment in On-
tario. The average rate of pay for a working week is
estimated as the product of the mean hourly wage
rate and the mean number of days worked per week
among the population engaged in paid employment.
Both are derived from the Labor Forces Survey un-
dertaken by Statistics Canada.(31) Life loss is calcu-
lated by multiplying the number of deaths by the
value for a statistical life. The value of a statistical life
is CAN$6.11 million, taken from the Canadian Cost-
Benefit Analysis Guide,(32) because federal depart-
ments and agencies use this resource for cost-benefit
analysis to support regulatory decisions in Canada.
Both DALY and COI are calculated using the
reported incidence rates and population data on an
annual basis. Average values based on the most re-
cent three years of available data are used to rep-
resent the two summary public health dimensions in
the risk profile. For all pathogens except L. monocy-
togenes, the average values reported here are based
on reported cases for 2002, 2003, and 2004. Since
there is no Canadian data reported beyond 2003 for
L. monocytogenes, the averages for DALY and COI
are based on 2001, 2002, and 2003.
3.2. Market Impact Factor
In addition to public health impacts, foodborne
pathogen incidence and outbreaks can have eco-
nomic effects in markets for food and agricultural
products.(33,34) Quantification of such effects is im-
portant not only in cases where an entire indus-
try is affected (e.g., BSE in Europe, Canada, and
the United States), but also when a single firm or
group of firms is affected by an outbreak (such as E.
coli 0157:H7 outbreaks at individual foodservice or
foodmanufacturing establishments with concomitant
spill-over effects). The info card for the market im-
pact factor for each pathogen-food combination in-
cludes a short description of the industry, a descrip-
tion of the economic measures included on the card,
and a table of data for the latest year used and for
a three-year average ending in the latest year used.
As discussed in detail below, all of these measures
reflect the size and characteristics of a market that
may be affected by foodborne pathogen incidence or
outbreaks rather than the actual impacts of such oc-
currences. Fig. 3 shows the market impact info card
for Campylobacter spp. in chicken.
Fig. 3. Information card for market
impact: Campylobacter spp.—Chicken.
There is a broad range of economic measures
that may be used to quantify potential domestic
and international market impacts related to dif-
ferent pathogen-food combinations in total and as
distributed across the supply chain. The info card
presents several measures to risk managers to help
inform and contextualize the potential distributional
consequences of incidence or outbreaks. These in-
clude farm cash receipts, total value at retail, value
of exports, value of imports, proportion of domestic
consumption of the food product produced domesti-
cally, and key export market and key import market
(respectively, export (import) volume of a food prod-
uct relative to overall agri-food exports (imports)).
Farm cash receipts (farm gate sales) reflect the po-
tential economic impact of the incidence of a food-
borne pathogen on primary agricultural production.
Including separate measures for value of retail sales
(the amount of the final consumer goods purchased
multiplied by the price consumers paid), exports, and
imports provides information useful in terms of gaug-
ing where a sector/market might be particularly vul-
nerable (e.g., from domestic market effects or largely
from trade actions). The ratio of domestic consump-
tion that was domestically produced and the ratio of
the product’s volume of imports (exports) to the to-
tal volume of agri-food imports (exports) reflect the
relative importance of the product domestically and
in terms of trade.
We selected a calculated measure, the economic
importance of the domestic market, as the summary
measure of market impact to be compared across
pathogen-food combinations. This measure is calcu-
lated as total value at retail plus the value of ex-
ports and less the value of imports. This summary
measure does not explicitly incorporate the distri-
bution of economic activities through the marketing
channel, although this distribution is represented in
other data presented on the info card. The aim of
this admittedly crude measure is to account for the
size of the economic activity at risk from foodborne
pathogen incidence or outbreaks. The size of the do-
mestic market is a surprisingly difficult concept to
capture. A measure of farm-level economic activity
alone ignores the sizeable processing sector in con-
temporary food supply chains. Moreover, there are
clear negative consequences for the food process-
ing, distribution, and retail sectors when foodborne
pathogen incidence and outbreaks result in reduced
consumption. Thus we use total value at retail as a
starting point for the summary measure in order to
reflect the entire value added along the marketing
channel. Many agri-food commodities are traded in-
ternationally and such markets can be important for
the domestic agri-food sector, hence the rationale for
adding the value of exports. For example, incidence
of foodborne pathogens can result in closure of bor-
ders or significant reductions in trade as a means of
providing sanitary and phytosanitary protection. At
the same time, deleting the value of imports from re-
tail sales ignores the value created domestically due
to value added to imported commodities, and in this
sense the measure of economic impact is an underes-
timate.
All of the measures presented on the info card,
including the summary measure, are not ideal in that
they reflect the size and characteristics of a market
that may be affected rather than the actual impacts
of foodborne pathogen incidence or outbreaks. How-
ever, our choice of market impact factors was guided
by several considerations. In particular, it is desir-
able to have measures of economic activity that are
objectively measurable, as well as transparent and
clear to decisionmakers, and that capture the size
of the market and the distribution of economic ac-
tivity along the marketing channel. Furthermore, it
is our experience that in the context of overall risk
prioritization for a large number of pathogen-food
combinations, it is challenging for several reasons to
obtain the data and conduct the in-depth analyses
necessary to pinpoint the potential market impacts
of a particular incidence or outbreak related to a
pathogen.
First, it is challenging to obtain the appropri-
ate data for markets and market-level impacts for
specific food products, particularly when these occur
over several related levels of the food supply chain.
For example, farm-cash receipts are not available for
processed foods such as ready-to-eat meats and spe-
cific information on exports and imports is also lack-
ing for this market. As a further example, effects
on wages and number of employees in a particular
sector should be taken into consideration; however,
these data were not available on a food-product level
in Canada. Further challenges arise across the board
for data on processed foods.
Second, while the economic effects arising from
foodborne pathogen incidence or outbreaks can be
large, they can also be difficult to predict. Even when
analysis is available based on incidents related to
specific pathogen-food combinations, it is difficult
to quantify how consumers and producers will re-
act to an incident related to different pathogen-food
combinations. Economic theory does provide some
insight into the expected direction of the effect; it is
nevertheless true that predictions of the magnitude
of any demand or supply curve shifts, and subsequent
changes in the price and quantity of supply and de-
mand, will reflect a high degree of uncertainty with-
out in-depth quantitative analysis. Such uncertainty
translates into imprecise measurement of the impact
of foodborne pathogen incidence or outbreaks on
producer surplus and money metric measures of con-
sumer utility (e.g., compensating variation, equiva-
lent variation, or even consumer surplus).
Further, even if the impact of a foodborne
pathogen incident on consumers and producers could
be measured with precision, these only reflect the di-
rect impact of that incident and tend to ignore the
distribution of costs along the supply chain. Other
indirect effects (e.g., multimarket spillover effects,
impacts on industries providing inputs to the di-
rectly affected sector, etc.) are equally important
but very difficult to measure without resorting to
applied/computable general equilibrium models.
Similarly, we may be able to estimate the costs to in-
dustry of the mitigating actions taken, but this does
not imply that these costs are not passed on to con-
sumers, at least in part, through prices. The degree to
which costs are passed on in this way will reflect mar-
ket structure, modes of competition, etc., and so are
likely to be quite case specific. Arguably, the mod-
els we employ provide sufficient detail to capture the
directly affected industry and at the same time are
sufficiently broad to enable measurement of intersec-
toral effects arising from a food safety incident.
Ideally, in measuring impacts one would strive to
undertake a full welfare analysis related to a food-
borne pathogen incidence or outbreak. However,
such analysis often takes considerable time and ef-
fort. It would also likely be largely idiosyncratic in
that results from a welfare analysis for one pathogen-
food combination may not lend themselves to extrap-
olation to other combinations. Conducting in-depth
economic impact analyses in the context of overall
risk prioritization for a large number of pathogen-
food combinations would be akin to also requiring
full-blown risk assessments for all the combinations.
In such circumstances, we argue that an alternative
means of capturing potential market-level effects in
an aggregate manner as proposed here is warranted.
Data for the potential market-level effects in-
cluded on the info card are obtained from Agri-
culture Economic Statistics (May 2007),(35) Statis-
tics Canada (CANSIM II),(36,37) and Agriculture and
Agri-Food Canada.(38) Averages for the respective
measures are calculated based on 2004, 2005, and
2006 data. The measures reported on the card as-
sume the impact is for a year in duration. The frame-
work can accommodate event durations longer or
shorter than a year by applying a discount adjust-
ment so that the value of market-level effects for dif-
ferent pathogen-food combinations are measured on
the same time scale.
3.3. Consumer Perception and Acceptance
of Risk Factor
Currently available frameworks for risk prioriti-
zation generally give little consideration to consumer
perception and acceptance of risk. However, it may
be a relevant factor to risk managers in choosing pri-
orities as consumer risk perception and acceptance
can affect how they view the net benefits of con-
suming a food. The info card for consumer percep-
tion and acceptance of risk for each pathogen-food
combination in the multifactorial risk prioritization
framework includes a short description of the crite-
ria used to capture this factor, the method used to
rank criteria, and a table of scores for the criteria and
for a summary measure of the criteria. Fig. 4 shows
the consumer perception and acceptance info card
for Campylobacter spp. in chicken.
A concern with including consumer risk percep-
tion and acceptance in risk prioritization is that con-
sumer perceptions of the risks associated with a par-
ticular pathogen-food combination may bear little
relationship to scientific determinations of risks as
measured by the probability of an adverse health
outcome.(39−41) Risk perceptions among the lay pub-
lic reflect many factors, including the way in which
risk contexts are framed, bias related to the ability
to mentally visualize an adverse health outcome oc-
curring, overconfidence in their own ability to assess
risk, and a tendency to discount very small risks. Fur-
ther, the acceptability of a particular risk takes ac-
count of a wide range of qualitative factors that do
not enter into a scientific risk assessment, including:
the degree to which the risk is perceived to be con-
trollable, whether exposure is voluntary or involun-
tary, the nature of the associated health outcomes
over time (in particular whether they are acute or
chronic), and perceptions of the individual’s and ex-
perts’ knowledge of the risk.(39,41,42)
Risk managers are aware of and may be influ-
enced by consumer risk perceptions and acceptance.
Consumers may be willing to accept a foodborne
pathogen risk if their perception of the risk is low or if
the perceived benefits arising from the consumption
of that particular food offset the perceived ill conse-
quences. Consumer perceptions of the risks associ-
ated with food can also be an important determinant
of the confidence the general public has in the food
system and in prevailing systems of public regulation
and oversight. Relatively small but highly visible out-
breaks of disease can have a profound impact on the
trust that consumers have in food producers, manu-
facturers, and/or distributors or in government reg-
ulators. Thus, consumer risk perception and accep-
tance can be an important factor in decision making
and as such is formally incorporated into this frame-
work to allow a transparent and systematic evalua-
tion of this factor. Of course, the perceptions of risk
managers with respect to consumer concerns may ex-
hibit biases, in the same way that consumer percep-
tions themselves are biased. Incorporating a measure
of consumer perceptions into the framework aims to
offset this bias.
Fig. 4. Information card for consumer
perception and acceptance of risk:
Campylobacter spp.—Chicken.
In this framework, consumer perceptions and ac-
ceptance of risk are defined by the degree to which
a particular food-pathogen risk is perceived as un-
controllable by consumers, unknown to the individ-
ual, unknown to scientists, involuntary, and known
to have a severe outcome. These have been shown
in the literature to be key qualitative dimensions
of risk perceptions. Our initial approach to quanti-
fying these five criteria for each case study was to
use expert opinion. Four members of the research
team with experience in consumer behavior regard-
ing food individually ranked the criterion into low,
medium, or high. Numerical values are assigned to
the nominal scales (low = 1, medium = 2, and high =
3) and the average score is calculated for each crite-
rion. The summary measure for this factor is an av-
erage calculated on the basis of the five criteria. The
average values for all five criteria are added and each
sum is normalized on the basis of a maximum value
of 15 to obtain an aggregated score between 0 and 1
that estimates consumer perception and acceptance
of risk for a particular pathogen-food combination. It
is important to note that this approach is used to gen-
erate data so that the framework could be illustrated.
We are currently conducting additional research to
better quantify this factor.
3.4. Social Sensitivity Factor
Risk prioritization may be influenced by the im-
pact of pathogen-food combinations on vulnerable
groups, with a greater weight put on these impacts
than on the “average” for society as a whole.(4) Fur-
ther, society may be interested in the wider social
consequences associated with foodborne illness, per-
haps representing external factors that spread be-
yond food consumers and food markets. Finally,
theremay be firms or other economic entities that are
particularly vulnerable to the impacts of pathogen in-
cidence or proposed interventions, for example, be-
cause of size or precarious economic circumstances.
The info card for the social sensitivity factor for each
pathogen-food combination includes a short descrip-
tion of the measure used to capture social sensitiv-
ity, a brief explanation of information used to gauge
social sensitivity for the pathogen-food combination,
and a table of data for the two social sensitivity
Fig. 5. Information card for social
sensitivity: Campylobacter spp.—
Chicken.
criteria used. Fig. 5 shows the social sensitivity info
card for Campylobacter spp. in chicken.
Social sensitivity may be a controversial factor to
include in risk prioritization because it is dependent
upon individual views and ethical positions. Interna-
tionally, there is no consensus on the relevance of
such issues in a risk-prioritization context. Nonethe-
less, FAO/WHO guidelines(3) for risk analysis and
the EU microbial risk framework(12) consider social
and ethical concerns in societies that develop and use
regulatory interventions to try to lower the burden of
microbial food- and waterborne hazards. The EU in
particular recognizes the need to consider the social
impacts of its food safety controls and regulations be-
yond Europe and in particular on developing coun-
tries.
It is important to note that social sensitivity to
impacts on a consumer group does not relate to
the potentially greater personal risk that some con-
sumers may face from a particular pathogen-food
combination. This is incorporated into the public
health factor. Rather, the issue is the disproportion-
ate or excess impact on particular groups in terms of
anticipated welfare consequences and the fact that
society as a whole tends to react to and be sensitive
to adverse impacts that these groups may experience.
Such concerns may relate to, for example, the groups’
more limited ability to take averting actions to self-
protect or to altruism. Similarly, on the food supply
side, social sensitivity does not reflect the economic
impact on particular groups per se, which is included
in the market impact factor. Instead, it reflects sen-
sitivity to, for example, particular groups’ economic
vulnerability to the adverse effects of risks from par-
ticular pathogen-food combinations, the role such
groups play in rural areas or as businesses in econom-
ically vulnerable areas, and their contribution to the
historical and/or social fabric of society.
Two vulnerable groups (consumers and firms in
the food supply chain) are chosen to represent the
social sensitivity dimension in this framework. The
consumer groups considered are the elderly, infants
and young children, low income consumers, aborig-
inal populations, and individuals with compromised
immune-systems. On the food supply side, the vul-
nerable groups considered include small producers,
small and medium-sized enterprises, enterprises in
marginal economic and/or aboriginal areas, and en-
terprises representing disproportionately important
sources of employment or livelihood.
The framework incorporates social sensitivity to
adverse effects from a particular pathogen-food com-
bination through use of binary values of 0 (no con-
cern) or 1 (concern) to reflect the existence of vulner-
able consumer groups and firms/economic groups.
The study authors assigned the score of 0 or 1 for
each pathogen-food combination by consensus of the
study authors in order to operationalize and illus-
trate the framework. These two binary variables are
first approximations for capturing social sensitivity
associated with different groups of consumers as well
as firms. We recognize that additional research is
Fig. 6. Summary card: Campylobacter
spp.—Chicken.
needed to make the quantification of this factor more
rigorous.
4. TOOLS FOR PRIORITIZING RISKS: INFO
CARDS ANDMULTICRITERIA
DECISION ANALYSIS
4.1. Info Cards
The summary measures for each of the four fac-
tors are gathered into a summary info card. Fig. 6
shows the summary card for Campylobacter spp. in
chicken. The five info cards (four factors and one
summary) for each pathogen-food combination are
the first tool provided to decisionmakers for risk pri-
oritization. Other groups have shown the value of
providing decisionmakers with risk summaries that
present information in consistent categories. For ex-
ample, summary sheets developed by Carnegie Mel-
lon(43) were found to be the most useful feature of
a risk ranking model for food safety.(44) The Cana-
dian Food and Inspection Agency(45) and the New
Zealand Food Safety Authority(10) have also devel-
oped risk summaries as a basis for decision making.
Systematic and consistent presentation of informa-
tion, in the format of information cards, can directly
inform risk management decisions and the complete
set provides context that is important for compar-
isons across pathogen-food combinations.
4.2. Multicriteria Decision Analysis
The second tool developed for use by risk man-
agers in this framework is based on multicriteria
decision analysis (MCDA) methodologies. These
methodologies are powerful tools for ranking mi-
crobial risks based on multiple factors including
public health, market impacts, consumer percep-
tion and acceptance, and social sensitivity. MCDA
methods have been utilized to address a range of
decision problems, including: the selection of solid
and nuclear waste management and treatment facil-
ities,(46−48) evaluation of irrigations systems,(49) and,
more recently, in evaluating interventions to improve
food safety(50) and human health.(51)
MCDA methodology is a powerful tool for clar-
ifying and documenting the importance assigned to
different factors in ranking risks. At the same time,
the application of such a formal analysis requires
that decisionmakers articulate their value structure,
including the prioritization factors they consider
and the value placed on each prioritization factor.
Some MCDA methods are well suited to devel-
oping consensus among decisionmakers particularly
when there are numerous stakeholders with different
values.(52,53)
PROMETHEE (Preference Ranking Organiza-
tion Method for Enrichment Evaluations), an out-
ranking method developed by Brans et al.(54,55) and
implemented in Decision Lab software (Visual Deci-
sion Inc., Montreal, QC, Canada), is used to demon-
strate the ranking of foodborne microbial risks
in a multifactorial framework. The PROMETHEE
methodology is based on pair-wise comparisons of
alternatives (i.e., pathogen-food combinations) on
each criterion (i.e., factor) separately so differences
in criteria scales do not influence the ranking. For
this analysis, simple ranking relationships are used.
Any positive difference in scores for two alterna-
tives results in a higher ranking for the alternative
with the higher score on that criterion. Complete
rankings are based on the aggregation of all crite-
ria with a weight assigned to each criterion and the
calculation of a net outranking flow for each alter-
native under consideration. This calculation includes
two components: the degree to which an alternative
outranks other alternatives and the degree to which
an alternative is outranked by other alternatives in
the set. In this application, a higher net outrank-
ing flow corresponds to higher risk. The complete
ranking approach may be compared with a utility
function.(52)
The PROMETHEE methodology permits a
“stability interval” analysis for a particular set of cri-
teria weights. The complete rankings for a set of al-
ternatives remain unchanged for any weight within
the stability interval defined for each criterion and
subject to the constraint that the sum of weights
(expressed as decimal fractions) across all criteria
is 1. This gives decisionmakers a starting point for
considering weight adjustments in order to reach
consensus in a group with different values. It may
save considerable discussion time, if it can be shown
that different value structures produce the same or
similar rankings.
5. RISK PRIORITIZATION RESULTS FOR
SIX CANADIAN CASE STUDIES
Six Canadian case studies are developed to il-
lustrate use of the multifactorial risk prioritiza-
tion framework: Campylobacter spp. in chicken;
Salmonella spp. in chicken and in spinach; Es-
cherichia coli O157 in spinach and in beef; and L.
monocytogenes in ready-to-eat meats. The top panel
of Table II shows the data included on the summary
info cards for the four factors for the case studies.
Two of the factors have two summary measures so in
total there are six summary measures: public health
(DALY and COI), market impact (economic impor-
tance of domestic market), consumer perception and
acceptance of risk (total normalized score), and so-
cial sensitivity (consumer and firm scores).
The risk profiles shown in the top panel of
Table II illustrate one of the challenges in compar-
ing and ranking microbial risks: each pathogen-food
combination performs differently across the four ma-
jor factors. Campylobacter spp. in chicken (C-C) and
Salmonella spp. in chicken (S-C) are the highest risks
based on the public health and market impact fac-
tors. In contrast, E. coli O157 in spinach (E-S) and
L. monocytogenes in ready-to-eat meats (L-RTEM)
have high values on the consumer perception and ac-
ceptance and social sensitivity scales. None of the
case studies dominates on all of the criteria (i.e.,
factors).
Three scenarios are compared in order to illus-
trate the flexibility of a MCDA tool to accommo-
date different stakeholder values. The first scenario
assumes the stakeholder values all four major factors,
placing equal weight on each. In the second scenario,
the stakeholder does not consider social sensitivity
and assigns equal weights for the remaining three
Table II. Risk Profiles for the Six Pathogen-Food Combinations and Weights Assigned by Each Stakeholder
Public Health Consumer Perception Social Sensitivity
Market Impact and Acceptance
DALY COI Econ. Imp. of the Domestic Normalized Scores Consumer 0–1 Firm 0–1
(years) (CAN$ million) Market (CAN$ Million) on 0–1 Scale Binary Score Binary Score
Pathogen-food combinationsa
C-C 808 64.8 5,472 0.3 0 0
S-C 449 54.2 5,472 0.25 0 0
S-S 1 0.14 118 0.5 0 0
E-S 3 0.35 118 0.8 1 0
E-B 260 28.1 5,264 0.6 1 0
L-RTEM 58 8.8 974 0.6 1 1
Weightsb
Stakeholder 1 0.125 0.125 0.25 0.25 0.125 0.125
Stakeholder 2 0.165 0.165 0.33 0.33 0 0
Stakeholder 3 0.50 0.50 0 0 0 0
aCampylobacter spp. in chicken (C-C), Salmonella spp. in chicken (S-C), Salmonella spp. in spinach (S-S), E.coli O157 in spinach (E-S),
E. coli O157 in beef (E-B), L. monocytogenes in ready-to-eat meats (L-RTEM).
bStakeholder 1: 4 factors, equal weights; Stakeholder 2: 3 factors, equal weights, and Stakeholder 3: public health only.
Table III. Complete Ranking PROMETHEE I for Three
Different Stakeholders
Scenariosa
RANKING Stakeholder 1 Stakeholder 2 Stakeholder 3
1 E-Bb C-C C-C
2 L-RTEM E-B S-C
3 C-C S-C E-B
4 S-C L-RTEM L-RTEM
5 E-S E-S E-S
6 S-S S-S S-S
aStakeholder 1: All four factors weighted equally. Stakeholder
2: Social sensitivity not included, other three factors equally
weighted. Stakeholder 3: Only public health factor weighted.
bCampylobacter spp. in chicken (C-C), Salmonella spp. in chicken
(S-C), Salmonella spp. in spinach (S-S), E.coliO157 in spinach (E-
S), E. coli O157 in beef (E-B), L. monocytogenes in ready-to-eat
meats (L-RTEM).
factors. In the third scenario, the stakeholder places
all weight on the public health factor. The bottom
panel of Table II shows the criteria and weightings
used by the three stakeholders.
The rankings under each scenario are shown in
Table III. Under the first scenario with Stakeholder
1, E. coli O157 in beef (E-B) ranked as the high-
est priority, followed by L. monocytogenes in RTE
meats (L-RTEM).When social sensitivity is removed
as a criterion by Stakeholder 2, Campylobacter spp.
in chicken (C-C) ranked first, E. coli O157 in beef
(E-B) moved to second place, and L. monocytogenes
in RTE meats (L-RTEM) is in the lower half of the
rankings. When only public health is taken into con-
sideration by Stakeholder 3, Campylobacter spp. in
chicken (C-C) and Salmonella spp. in chicken (S-
C) are the two highest risked priorities. All three
stakeholders rank E. coli O157 in spinach (E-S) and
Salmonella spp. (S-S) as the lowest risks for the six
case studies.
Table IV shows stability intervals for each crite-
rion in the first and second scenarios. The stability
intervals for Stakeholder 1 allow some modification
of weights but all of the intervals are more con-
strained than those for Stakeholder 2. Although the
social sensitivity factor is not considered by Stake-
holder 2, the stability analysis shows that consumer
and firm sensitivities could be included with weights
up to 0.105 without changing the complete rankings.
However, this would require adjustments in weights
for the other criteria so that the adjusted weights
remain within the stability intervals and the sum of
all weights is 1.
It is important to recognize that while MCDA
methodologies provide tools to improve the decision-
making process, they do not replace decisionmak-
ers. Risk managers must identify the alternatives that
are under consideration as well as the criteria and
weights for the ranking algorithm. Furthermore, they
must evaluate the rankings and may need to return to
the framework’s knowledge base and the info cards
for additional information about particular microbial
risks in order to understand and refine the rankings.
Table IV. Stability Intervals for
Complete Rankings: Stakeholder 1 and
Stakeholder 2
Scenarios
Stakeholder 1 Stakeholder 2
Criterion Weight Stability Interval Weight Stability Interval
DALY 0.125 0.087 to 0.125 0.165 0.0 to 0.371
COI 0.125 0.087 to 0.125 0.165 0.0 to 0.371
Market level 0.25 0.226 to 0.250 0.33 0.221 to 0.448
Consumer perceptions 0.25 0.250 to 0.268 0.33 0.263 to 0.391
Social sensitivity—consumer 0.125 0.125 to 0.160 0.0 0.0 to 0.105
Social sensitivity—firm 0.125 0.125 to 0.160 0.0 0.0 to 0.105
6. CONCLUSION AND FURTHERWORK
The multifactorial risk prioritization framework
has been presented for feedback and recommenda-
tions to select groups of policymakers and risk ana-
lysts in public health regulatory agencies in Canada
and the United States. Based on initial comments,
there is agreement that the four major factors are rel-
evant to risk prioritization decisions although there
is need for further discussion about the specific mea-
sures. The framework clearly allows dimensions to be
added or removed. However, it is important to un-
derstand that each dimension requires intensive data
gathering and analysis.
The framework would benefit significantly from
the availability of better data on all factors used in
the analysis. For example, a key issue for comparing
risks at the level of pathogen-food pairs is the attribu-
tion of illness to different foods. Several groups are
working to improve food attribution methods(56−59)
and members of our research group are collaborat-
ing with the Public Health Agency of Canada on a
project to develop better estimates of food attribu-
tion for the Canadian population. The info cards for
the case studies are implemented in spreadsheet for-
mats but work is underway to develop an integrated
database. The proposed measures for the four major
risk factors can be modified in particular contexts if
riskmanagers are not satisfied with them. In any case,
the underlying knowledge base must be updated on
a regular basis.
Two additional aspects of risk prioritization are
the subject of further work on the framework. The
first is to analyze uncertainty in the risk profile
measures and the impact of this uncertainty on fi-
nal rankings. An initial approach is to reflect as-
pects of uncertainty that can be addressed through
the use of discrimination thresholds in the ranking
or preference relationships defined for each crite-
rion in PROMETHEE. For example, an indifference
threshold can be defined for each criterion. Obvi-
ously there would be a tradeoff between the magni-
tude of the indifference threshold and the ability to
differentiate risk rankings. We recognize there may
be considerable uncertainty in some circumstances
(e.g., the case of a new hazard) and risk managers
must be aware of how this affects rank positions. Un-
certainty in ranking for a pathogen-food pair would
be a clear indicator that one or more aspects of
the multifactorial risk assessment stage (Block B in
Fig. 1) need to be addressed. A second further step is
to begin assessment of interventions to control risks.
Intervention analysis is expressly excluded from the
framework presented here in order to prevent its
conflation with risk prioritization.
The multifactorial risk prioritization framework
aims to improve the decision-making process by
providing tools necessary to allow multiple cross-
disciplinary factors to be handled in a scientific
and rigorous manner. In addition, it promotes a
balanced and transparent decision-making process.
This framework provides important decision-support
tools for risk managers, ones that will enable them
to make scientifically sound and defensible risk man-
agement decisions in an effective and expedient
manner.
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